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The good, the evil, and the mundane: the place of the
sacred in the modern world
It is often claimed that we live in a secular age. But we do not live in a desacralized one. Sacred
forms – whether in ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ guise – continue to shape social life in the modern world,
giving rise to powerful emotions, polarized group identities, and even the very concept of moral
society. In his recent book, Gordon Lynch sets out a theory of the sacred drawing on Durkheim’s
work and asks us to develop moral reflexivity, which Eric Taylor Woods finds unconvincing.
The Sacred in the Modern World. Gordon Lynch. Oxford
University Press, February 2012.
 Find this book: 
In this well-written and thought-provoking book, Gordon Lynch sets out
to develop a theoretical framework for analysing the sacred in the
modern world. For readers unfamiliar with the concept; the sacred
refers to taken-for-granted norms that exert claims upon the social life.
In other words, the sacred denotes the moral dimension of the social
life; it is that which we hold as ‘good’ (even if, as Lynch discusses in
the book, it can often have negative consequences). Examples of
sacred forms might include belief in the value of human rights or in the
ethnic purity of one’s nation. Before reviewing Lynch’s treatment of the
sacred, I should make clear my affinities with his approach. If I am at
all critical, it is in the spirit of humbly seeking to develop it rather than
detract from it.
In the first part of the book, Lynch reviews how the sacred has been
treated in the scholarly literature. He identifies two main interpretations: ontological and cultural. Lynch
is critical of the former, which he traces through the work of Rudolph Otto, Mircea Eliade and Bernhard
Giesen, among others. In Lynch’s view, the problem with the ontological interpretation is that it defines
the sacred as an objective universal phenomenon, thereby ignoring how and why particular sacred
forms arise in different social contexts. A better interpretation, according to Lynch, is the cultural
sociological interpretation, which he locates in the writings of Émile Durkheim, Edward Shils, Robert
Bellah and, especially, Jeffrey Alexander. For Lynch, this latter approach is superior because it treats
the sacred as culturally constructed within historically contingent contexts, which paves the way for
uncovering how different sacred forms arise and their influence on the social life.
Lynch then tests and extends the cultural sociological framework via two case-studies. In the first case
study, he analyses why the abuse and neglect of children was endemic in the Catholic-run Irish
industrial school system. By suggesting that the definition of Ireland as a Catholic nation deflected
criticism of the schools, Lynch shows how one sacred form (i.e. the nation) took precedence over
another sacred form (i.e. children). In the second case-study, Lynch explores the significance of public
media in constructing, reifying and contesting sacred forms through an analysis of the decision of the
BBC not to broadcast a humanitarian appeal for the victims of Israel’s military action in the Gaza strip
in January 2009. Here Lynch shows how, for many British citizens, the BBC’s decision ruptured its
capacity to mediate the sacred.
Finally, Lynch engages in a normative discussion in light of his findings that sacred forms can have both
positive and negative consequences, which he refers to as the ‘light’ and ‘shadow’ of the sacred.
Arguing that it is not possible to banish the sacred entirely from the social life, Lynch asks how we
might mitigate its shadow. He suggests that societies should nurture the capacity for critical reflection
on their sacred commitments, referred to as ‘moral reflexivity’. Lynch further argues that the increasing
diversity of sacred forms in the late-modern era may prove to be helpful in this regard by making it
more difficult for one segment of society to impose its interpretation of the sacred. Here Lynch
suggests that societies characterized by multiple sacred forms should develop a type of ‘moral
agonism’, in which competing segments of society would peacefully contest their norms.
This book has much to recommend. Although it should be properly seen as an attempt to refine the
approach developed by Alexander rather than to develop a wholly new theory, the book nevertheless
provides numerous important contributions. Lynch’s identification of two broad streams of thought on
the sacred is a much needed elucidation of the field that may shape future research and debate. Also,
his discussion of the differences between the sacred (i.e. ‘good’), profane (i.e. ‘evil’) and mundane (i.e.
everyday life) is cogent and informative. The empirical section of the book is a good illustration of
Lynch’s framework and the cases he analyses are fascinating. I especially found the normative part of
the book to be engaging. Cultural sociologists are generally wary about treading too far into normative
theory and Lynch’s willingness to do so is refreshing. Yet, this was also the part of the book I disagreed
with most. Working through my reasons why, however, has done much to clarify my own position and, in
this sense, I value his argument.
Should we seek to develop moral reflexivity, as Lynch suggests? And is this even possible? I believe
that the answer to both of these questions is no. Lynch is right to point out that there is a shadow side to
the sacred and history is replete with examples of this. But does this justify fostering reflexivity about our
sacred commitments? For example, should those that believe the Holocaust is evil be made to reflect
upon the possibility that this is but one interpretation among many? I hope not. Luckily, I do not think this
is even possible. It is the impossibility of being reflexive about the sacred that, in part, defines it. Thus,
the impossibility of denying the evil meaning of the Holocaust reveals its sacrality. By contrast, if many
of us in the West have become reflexive about certain sacred forms, such as institutional religion, this
indicates that they are no longer sacred. To acknowledge that Christianity does not have all the
answers is an implicit acknowledgement that it is no longer sacred.
Probably Lynch did not mean for us to become reflexive about the evil meaning of the Holocaust. But
how then would we choose which sacred forms to critically reflect upon? It is this question that reveals
the moral agonism that Lynch propounds to be a chimera. It is an arena for debating norms that are no
longer held to be sacred, at least by the elites that set the terms of debate. Meanwhile, the norms that
are sacred and inform such terms are hors du débat. If we were to allow a true conflict over the sacred
to take place, there can be no terms of debate and we cannot assume that it would be peaceful. Given
the impossibility and ethical ambiguity of fostering moral reflexivity, I therefore submit that the task
remains to find universal sacred forms.
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